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Challenging institutionalisation as torture has a long tradition in human rights advocacy,
for obvious reasons – but with not so obvious consequences. Freedom from torture is a
cornerstone of the international human rights protection system, and a finding of torture
brings with it a serious moral condemnation. But litigators do not simply want to make
a point by winning before courts. They are looking for remedies which help individual
victims and those affected similarly, by transforming policies. They want change on the
ground, not declarations. This chapter looks at the advantages and disadvantages of
relying on the torture framework to challenge institutionalisation of persons with
disabilities at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
1. Institutionalisation as Torture in International Law
Human rights organisations monitoring institutions of persons with disabilities have
often described institutionalisation through the lens of ill-treatment.1 They have reported
on practices which have already been found to constitute elements of torture in other
settings, such as prisons or asylum centres.2 The reports established that dilapidated
physical conditions, overcrowding, lack of privacy, lack of meaningful activities, poor
access to healthcare, forced treatment, restraints, physical and sexual abuse are
widespread in institutions for persons with disabilities.3
Despite the fact that the conditions in institutions are often worse than in prisons, it
took a long time for international courts to recognise institutions as places of ill-
treatment. This finally happened with the judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights (European Court) in Stanev v. Bulgaria, which reviewed the conditions in the
Pastra home, arguably the worst social care institution in Bulgaria.4 However, this
important precedent did not lead to a surge of successful litigation. It was followed by
Stankov v. Bulgaria, but no other cases since then.5 The European Court found other
types of violations connected to institutions but did not classify these as ill-treatment.6
1 János Fiala-Butora, ‘Disabling Torture: the Obligation to Investigate Ill-treatment of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2013) 45 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 214. 
2 For examples of how the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee against Tor-
ture (CAT) addressed some aspects of torture affecting persons with disabilities, such as restraints and
forced sterilizations, see Phil Fennel, ‘Article 15: Protection against Torture and Cruel or Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment’ in Ilias Bantekas, Michael Stein, and Dimitris Anastasiou (eds.), Com-
mentary on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2018), 426-465.
3 Janet E. Lord, ‘Shared Understanding or Consensus-Masked Disagreement? The Anti-Torture
Framework in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2010) 33 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp.
L. Rev. 27.
4 Stanev v. Bulgaria App no 36760/06 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012).
5 Stankov v. Bulgaria App no 25820/07 (ECtHR, 17 March 2015).
6 For example D.D. v. Lithuania App no 13469/06 (ECtHR, 14 February 2012).
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During the negotiations on the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD), disability advocates tried not simply to abolish certain practices
harming persons with disabilities but to have them declared as torture. Involuntary
treatment or the use of restraints are good examples. The text of the CRPD is not
sufficiently clear on these practices, therefore advocacy continues since its adoption as well. 
Institutionalisation was also argued to constitute torture. However, the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) has not considered conditions
in institutions as torture under Article 15 of the CRPD, only as abuse under Article 16. It
found a violation of Article 16 on the account of poor living conditions,7 insufficient
nutrition,8 neglect,9 and violence in institutions.10 None of these problems warranted an
examination of institutionalisation as torture in the CRPD Committee’s view.
2. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Torture Framework
There are obvious advantages to recognising a practice not simply as a human rights
violation, but specifically as torture or another form of ill-treatment. Torture is the most
serious violation of the human right to personal integrity and dignity.11 It is an absolute
right which permits no derogations or limitations.12 Resource constraints can justify the
limitations of other rights, but not freedom from torture.13 The state is obliged to provide
redress to victims of torture, including by prosecuting perpetrators.14
Freedom from torture does not permit taking into account competing interests. If
something is classified as torture, its use must not simply be limited or curtailed, but
discontinued without debate. Not recognising involuntary treatment or restraints as
torture would legitimise these coercive practices and provide wide discretion to states
on how and to what extent to police their use. It would invite counter-interests and
counterarguments, both legitimate and illegitimate, to be balanced against the rights of
victims, and used as excuses to retain illicit practices. 
In the long run, the “correct” use of coercion, as opposed to its “abuse”, would be a
question determined individually, which domestic authorities are better placed to review
than international bodies. This particularly empowers medical professionals, as they have
7          CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia, UN Doc CRPD/C/SRB/CO/1 (23 May 2016)
para 31.
8 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Latvia, UN Doc CRPD/C/LVA/CO/1 (10 October 
2017) para 28.
9 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Armenia, UN Doc CRPD/C/ARM/CO/1 (8 May
2017) para 27, CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Republic of Moldova, UN Doc
CRPD/C/MDA/CO/1 (18 May 2017) para 32.
10 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Lithuania, UN Doc CRPD/C/LTU/CO/1 (11 May 
2016) para 32.
11 Manfred Nowak, ‘Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak’ A/63/175 (28 July 2008) para 50.
12 Juan E. Méndez, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez’ A/HRC/22/53 (1 February 2013) para 82.
13 ibid., para. 83.
14 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Slovenia, UN Doc CRPD/C/SVN/CO/1 (5 March
2018) para 26; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Montenegro, UN Doc CRPD/C/MNE/CO/1
(22 September 2017) para 31; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia, UN Doc
CRPD/C/SRB/CO/1 (23 May 2016) para 28.
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the most direct first-hand information about each case, and their determinations
necessarily involve the application of medical norms. It is easy to see why many victims
would find this solution unacceptable. After all, in terms of power relations, it is not that
different to what we had before the CRPD. It has led to significant suffering and abuses,
which the CRPD aims to overcome, not preserve. 
Freedom from torture is also an immediate obligation. That feature is particularly
appealing to advocates who are no doubt frustrated by the slow progress in
implementing rights which are subject to progressive realisation. The standards of
progressive realisation are unclear, and thus difficult to review by international bodies.
As such, progressive realisation has often been used by states as an excuse to delay
honouring their obligations flowing from human rights treaties, although such excuses
are unjustifiable.
Similar arguments have also been used in defence of institutionalisation. It has been
explicitly recognised as a human rights violation some time ago, at least since the
adoption of the CRPD, whose article 19 protects the right to independent living. States
parties have been required to implement de-institutionalisation plans. Yet progress has
often been unsatisfactory. States are both delaying the transformation of social services
and are also questioning the goal itself by referring to competing interests, be those of
staff, the community, the government providing funds, or residents of institutions who
allegedly “like it” inside institutions and want to stay within them. 
In the face of such resistance, framing institutionalisation as torture is undeniably quite
appealing. It attaches a particular moral condemnation to the practice, which might be
more difficult for states to own up to. It would send a clear message that transferring
residents to the community is not up for debate, and that it cannot wait. However,
portraying a practice as ill-treatment also has its disadvantages. Arguing and proving all
attributes of torture can be problematic in the case of coercive practices, including
institutionalisation.
Only those practices which achieve a particular level of severity can be classified as ill-
treatment, and only the most severe of these can be considered torture. This might be
too high a threshold to reach with institutionalisation alone. Some practices, some
instances of institutional experience could no doubt meet the threshold, but declaring
the practice of institutionalisation as ill-treatment per se might be too big of a step for
courts to take, condemning this strategy to perpetual unsuccessfulness. 
Since the prohibition of torture is absolute, no exceptions can be accepted under it. This
means that if institutionalisation is identified as torture, the only legitimate goal would
be to eliminate it immediately instead of gradually reducing its occurrence. This is
contrary to what states are currently trying to achieve, and what many consider a
laudable goal.15 We must recognise that the need for immediate transformation of social
services does have legitimate constraints, such as the need for resource allocations, staff
15 Brian O’Donoghue, ‘Coercion: an understudied issue in mental health’ (2017) 34 Irish Journal of 
Psychological Medicine 222; Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton (Eds.) Coercive care: Rights, law and
policy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).
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training, rehabilitation of clients, etc. The absolute nature of the prohibition of torture
does not provide space for such considerations to be taken into account. It is simply not
a framework suited for balancing competing interests in a complicated policy framework.
Torture requires states to take an immediate all or nothing approach, and if they are
presented with that choice, states might be very tempted to opt for “nothing” if they see
the alternative as impossible to implement. 
States Parties are bound by the CRPD, but they have possibilities not to comply with
a norm which they consider impossible to implement. They can resort to wilful non-
compliance. If there is consensus among them, it will be hard for the CRPD
Committee to overcome their resistance, especially since it is the states that are
parties to the CRPD, and their subsequent agreements and practices are a source of
its interpretation.16 They can also create exceptions by reclassifying some forms of
institutionalisation as not-torture. This seems impossible due to the absolute nature
of prohibition of torture, but in fact it is not without precedent in international law.
A very similar approach was adopted by the European Court in the Herczegfalvy
case,17 where the prolonged use of restraints, which would be otherwise considered
ill-treatment, was considered not to constitute ill-treatment if medically necessary.
Medical necessity might not be accepted as a justification under the CRPD, but other
similar similar justifications could be. States would only need to find a disability-
neutral way of phrasing the conditions for permissible institutionalisation, and
thereby remove them from the CRPD’s scope. This neutrality would only be formal,
although the impact would still disproportionally affect persons with disabilities.
Nevertheless, it might be seen by many as a viable option if the alternative is
portrayed as seeking the impossible. Interestingly, such a disability-neutral approach
formally avoiding violation of the CRPD has already been proposed under other
articles of the CRPD.18
Also, it seems to be clear that notwithstanding differences in pace across states, de-
institutionalisation will take some time. At least for a temporary period, institutions are
here to stay, and some persons will be moved to the community faster than others.19
The absolute prohibition of torture is not the best framework to deal with such
temporary situations. Due to its absolute nature, it requires immediate implementation.20
States cannot legitimately experiment with safeguards and regulation in order to monitor
and limit the practices which are recognised as torture.21 This means that at least for a
temporary period, victims staying in institutions would enjoy less protection in a torture
framework than they might in a different one.
16 Article 31(3) b) and c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(27 January 1980).
17 Herczegfalvy v. Austria App no 10533/83 (ECtHR, 24 September 1992).
18 Wayne Martin, Sabine Michalowsky, Timo Jütten, Matthew Burch, ‘Achieving CRPD Compliance,
Is the Mental Capacity Act of England and Wales Compatible with the UN CRPD? If not, what next?’ An
Essex Autonomy Project Position Paper (22 September 2014).
19 Peter Bartlett and Marianne Schulze, ‘Urgently awaiting implementation: The right to be free
from exploitation, violence and abuse in Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities (CRPD)’ (2017) 53 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 9.
20 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Slovakia, UN Doc CRPD/C/SVK/CO/1 (17 May 
2016) para 46.
21 Juan E. Méndez (n 12) para 89 b).
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The CRPD Committee has recognised similar temporary adjustments to otherwise
applicable rules under other articles. For example, under Article 14, while it requires the
abolition of involuntary hospitalisation, “until as such time as these provisions have been
amended”, it has required Latvia to implement court review of hospitalisations.22
Similarly, while the Committee rejects the practice of sheltered workshops, it required
Hong Kong to raise the daily allowance for persons in sheltered workshops to protect
them from exploitation under Article 16.23 The Committee and States Parties do not
enjoy such flexibility under the torture framework, which might leave victims worse off,
at least in the short run. 
Lastly, the torture framework might also not offer the most effective remedies to victims.
I have argued elsewhere that criminal law is not an appropriate solution for many victims
with disabilities suffering from ill-treatment in institutions due to, among others,
accessibility problems, the violations’ systemic nature, and criminal law’s focus on the
perpetrator rather than the victim.24 In the case of institutionalisation, the picture is even
more complicated. Who is the perpetrator in this case? Is a criminal sanction such as
prison time for a nurse or social care worker an adequate response? Maybe there is a
legitimate point to make about how and under what conditions it might be, but it is very
difficult to imagine how members of the care professions would participate in such a
discussion. And without their involvement, it is hard to develop alternative services.
Other articles of the CRPD are more suited to introduce a different range of remedies
that aim at reducing unwanted practices, such as educational, administrative and social
measures.25
3. How does the Pandemic Change the Calculus?
The above general reasons apply in usual times. However, the global COVID-19 pandemic
creates extraordinary circumstances. How does it change the relevance of the torture
framework in respect of institutionalisation? 
Other chapters in this volume have shown that a direct correlation between
institutionalisation and death from COVID-19 have emerged in several countries. The
consequences of contracting the virus go beyond a high chance of dying. Many patients
describe the illness as very painful, no doubt reaching the required level of severity to
constitute ill-treatment. To be sure, it is not the authorities causing pain to the victims
– but by keeping them in settings where they have a very high chance of contracting the
virus, they are knowingly exposing them to a high risk of suffering. This goes contrary
to their obligations, which is to protect persons from suffering. 
Those who might not get infected are also suffering the psychological effects of being
exposed to the high risk of undergoing a severe illness and dying from it. This
psychological suffering is especially pronounced in the case of residents of institutions
22 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Latvia, UN Doc CRPD/C/LVA/CO/1 (10 October
2017) para 25. (b).
23 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: China, UN Doc CRPD/C/CHN/CO/1 (15 October 
2012) para 68.
24 János Fiala-Butora (n 1).
25 Bartlett and Schulze (n 19) 7.
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where the virus has already been detected. Not being able to take the only safe option
and leave the place, they are essentially trapped in a room with death itself. Even if they
survive, psychological suffering is inevitable. The European Court has recognised the
concept of psychological torture and would likely be able to understand it in these
circumstances as well.26
An important consequence of the pandemic is that care staff are no longer the ones
causing the suffering – they are also the victims of it. This is very different than
involuntary treatment and restraints, where they take on the roles of perpetrators. They
might be much more supportive of disability advocates’ arguments describing the
situation as torture, and many might share the goal as well: release residents to settings
where they are safer. 
4. Conclusion – How to Choose the Best Way to Proceed
Litigators are not restricted to rely only on freedom from torture when challenging
institutionalisation. They can use other provisions of international law in addition to the
prohibition of torture. The right to independent living and the right to private life are
amenable to review and oversee the different questions related to effective
implementation of deinstitutionalisation strategies, such as resource constraints, priority
settings, and temporary situations. Torture is not an effective framework for these tasks,
and the pandemic has not changed that. 
However, the pandemic has changed some other aspects of the relevance of the torture
framework and has made it a more effective avenue to argue for urgent solutions. If
freedom from torture had some attractive features before, it has become an almost
unavoidable element in an effective strategy to respond to the pandemic. 
As explained above, the pandemic helps us overcome some of the shortcomings of the
torture framework which would otherwise caution us against resorting to it. With regard
to the others, it depends on the precise remedies asked for. Governments might argue
that emergency de-institutionalisation requires difficult policy decisions to be made
which are resource- and time-intensive. That is true. However, coming up with a clear
emergency plan with reasonable timelines is neither resource- nor time-intensive: it can
be done in a short time, and can rely on the existing administrative capacities of the
state. If litigators asked for this remedy, courts could be sympathetic, and governments
could have a hard time explaining why they are unwilling to comply with such a request. 
Governments might argue that an obligation to de-institutionalise is not new, it existed
before the pandemic as well. That argument could be reversed by litigators. The fact that
governments had such an obligation before the pandemic means that they should have
closed the institutions already. The fact they have not done that has exposed and
subjected a large number of persons with disabilities to excruciating physical and mental
suffering. They did not intend that, nobody did, but it nevertheless happened because of
their failure to act. And it will happen again, unless they finally honour their obligations.
26 Irfan Neziroglu, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Mental and Psychological Suffering as Torture, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment under International Human Rights Treaty Law’ (2007) 4
Essex Hum. Rts. Rev. 1.
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The pandemic is proof that institutionalisation as a cause of ill-treatment is no longer a
speculation, a fanciful argument: it has become provable fact. Overcoming it has become
more important and urgent than ever. When the next pandemic comes (because it will
come, the question is only when), governments should no longer be able to argue that
they did not know the impacts on persons with disabilities in institutions. They do now. 
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